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1. INTRODUCTION
On August 19, 2009, the Swiss banking giant UBS agreed to
turn over to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") information
regarding 4,450 accounts suspected of containing undeclared
assets.' The agreement represented a "major step forward with
the IRS's efforts to pierce the veil of bank secrecy and combat off-
shoe tx vason"2 Iisetmated that tax evasion will cost the
United States over $100 billion this year in lost tax revenues.'
While being the largest hedge fund domicile and fifth largest
banking provider in the world, the Cayman Islands is also well
known for being a tax haven.4 Although many U.S. individuals
and corporations invest legally in the Cayman Islands,' it is sus-
pected that many U.S. hedge fund investors do not declare their
investments.' John M. Mathewson, former owner of Guardian
1. Wayne Tompkins, UBS to divulge 4,450 Account Names, More Expected, THE
DAILY Bus. REV., Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/
news.html?news id=56889&stripTemplate=l; Settlement Agreement, United States
v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2009).
2. Press Release, Department of Justice, Remarks by IRS Commissioner Doug
Shulman on UBS (Aug. 19, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv09-
IRS-Commissioner_-Remarks.htm.
3. STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND
SECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., TA~X HAVEN BANKS AND~ U.S. TA~X
COMPLIANCE 1 (Comm. Print 2008), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/
07 l7OSPSIReport.pdf.
4. STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND
SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, i110TH CONG., DIVIDEND TAX AHUSE: How
OFFSHORE ENTITIES DODGE TAXES ON U.S. STOCK DIVIDENDS 14 (Comm. Print 2008),
available at http:/flevin.senate.gov/newsroomi/supporting/2008/09108DividendTax
Abuse.pdf; Timothy V. Addison, Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens, 16 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 703,719-21 (2009); Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Citizens Hide
Hundreds of Billions in Cayman Accounts, 103 TAX NOTES 956 (2004) (discussing tax
evasion by U.S. persons in the Cayman Islands and TIEAs).
5. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUTmrAILITY OFFICE, REP. TO THE CHAIRMAN
AND RANKING MEMBER, COMM. ON FINANCE, U.S. S., CAYMAN ISLANDS: BUSIN'ESS AND
TAX ADVANTAGES ATTRACT U.S. PERSONS AND ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES EXIST 4
(2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09677t.pff (stating that U.S. tax
exempt entities, such as university endowments and pensions funds, invest in hedge
funds legally).
6. Lee A. Sheppard & Martin A. Sullivan, Offshore Explorations: Caribbean
Hedge Funds, Part 1, 118 TAX NOTES 95, 106 (2008) (noting that tax evasion must be
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Bank and Trust located in the Caymnan Islands, testified in a Sen-
ate hearing that "clients opening an offshore account were doing
so for tax evasion .... "I Moreover, retired Manhattan district
attorney Robert Morgenthau believes that "Switzerland is not the
No. 1 problem any more. The Caymans is the biggest problem
")8
U.S. investors suspected of evading taxes in the Cayman
Islands also allegedly invest in Cayman Islands hedge funds.
These investors could be either U.S. citizens and corporations or
non-U.S. citizens and corporations who use a Cayman fund to
"facilitate significant investment in the United States."' Investors
in the Cayman Islands aim to evade dividend taxes."0 Individuals
are also suspected of setting up "complex networks of domestic
and offshore entities" in order to hide their schemes." In most
cases, the corporation or individual invests as an exempted com-
pany, prohibited "from trading in the Cayman Islands with any
person, firm, or other corporation except in furtherance of their
business that is carried on outside the Cayman Islands."" Thus,
the individual or corporation has a Cayman Islands bank account
and invests in the Cayman Islands merely to evade U.S. taxes.
In reaction, the U.S. government has recently increased its
focus on wealthy Americans evading taxes through foreign coun-
tries. IRS Commissioner Shulman stated that "[ilnternational
enforcement is a top priority for the Treasury Secretary and me."'"
Victor Song, deputy chief of the IRS's criminal investigations divi-
sion said international tax evasion is "near and dear to the com-
missioner's heart" and "[elverybody's revved up to deal with this
placed high on the list of reasons U.S. investors invest in Cayman Islands hedge
funds); see also DIVIDEND T~x ABUSE, supra note 4, at 15 (citing Report of the
President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the
Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management, at 41 (1999), available at http:I/www.
treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfind.pdf).
7. Role of U.S. Correspondent Banking in International Money Laundering Before
the Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of John
M. Mathewson), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?db
name= 107_senate..hearings&docid=f:71 166.wais.
8. Ken Stier, After UBS, Swiss Continue to Fight for Bank Secrecy, TIME, Mar. 5,
2010, available at http://www.time.comtime/world/article/,8599,196425,00.html.
9. BUSINESS AND TAX ADVANTAGES, supra note 5, at 16.
10. BUSINESS AND TAx ADVANTAGES, supra note 5, at 28-34.
11. BUSINESS AND TAx ADVANTAGES, supra note 5, at 33.
12. BUSINESS AND TAx ADVANTAGES, supra note 5, at 12.
13. Remarks by IRS Commissioner Shulman, supra note 2.
9
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issue. .. ."' The current tax battle is not just a national issue. In
February 2008, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Spain, and
Australia announced that they had initiated an informal enforce-
ment action against Liechtenstein's LGT Bank.' 5 More recently,
the German Finance Minister stated "[tlhere's no future for bank
secrecy. It's finished. It's time has run out." 6 Nevertheless, the
IRS's current fight against the wealthy has stalled. On January
21, 2010, Switzerland's Federal Administrative Court ruled in
favor of a U.S. UBS account holder and ordered the Federal Tax
Administration to not disclose account data to the IRS. 17
This article will argue that the IRS v. UBS settlement was
not a "major step forward""8 in the fight against tax evasion; the
only way for the U.S. government to take a major step forward is
by passing legislation aimed at curbing tax evasion practices. The
first section will define hedge fund and address laws that have
made the Cayman Islands the largest hedge fund domicile in the
world. This section will also address the chief tax evasion prac-
tices the IRS suspects is taking place in the Cayman Islands. The
second section will analyze the relationship between the U.S. and
the Cayman Islands in regard to tax evasion. This section will
examine the methods that the United States has used to curb tax
evasion: in particular, establishing the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development and the Tax Information
Exchange Agreements. Section three will discuss the IRS v. UBS
case and its settlement agreement. Next, the article will examine
whether the IRS would have similar success with Cayman Islands
hedge funds through a "John Doe" summons. It will also analyze
the issues the U.S. government faces with the UBS settlement
agreement and future legal action against the Cayman Islands.
The article will conclude with a forecast of what hedge fund corpo-
14. Joyce E. Cutler, International Enforcement a Global Issue for Foreseeable
Future, Officials Emphasize, INTL TAX MONITOR, Oct. 29, 2009.
15. TAX HAVEN BANxKs AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 3, at 2 ("In February
2008, a global tax scandal erupted after a former employee of a Liechtenstein trust
company provided tax authorities around the world with data on about 1,400 persons
with accounts at LGT Bank in Liechtenstein.").
16. Stier, supra note 8.
17. Press Release, Medienmitteilung, Legal Assistance Proceedings in the Case of
UBS (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.bundesverwaltungsgericht.ch/20100122
mmamtshilfeurtel-e.pdf, Bloomberg News, U.S.- UBS Deal is Undermined by Swiss
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/27/
business/global/27ubs.html; Lee A. Sheppard, U.S. Justice Department Reacts to
Swiss Disclosure Case, 57 TAX No'rEs INT'L 412 (2010).
18. Remarks by IRS Commissioner Shulman, supra note 2.
360
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rations and their investors in the Cayman Islands will do to pre-
pare for an anticipated focus by the IRS on the Cayman Islands.
II. HEDGE FUNDS AND THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
A. Defining Hedge Funds
Hedge funds have grown exponentially in the past decade.
"From 1998 to early 2007, the estimated number of [hedge] funds
grew from more than 3,000 to more than 9,000 and assets under
management from $200 billion to more than $2 trillion globally."19
Despite this, U.S. hedge funds are "lightly regulated" 0 and have
"4no universally accepted definition.""' Black's Law Dictionary
defines a hedge fund as "a specialized investment group usually
organized as a limited partnership or offshore investment com-
pany that offers the possibility of high returns through risky tech-
niques such as selling short or buying derivatives." 2
In testimony given before the Subcommittee on Capital Mar-
kets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office's Orice Williams characterized
hedge funds as: (1) "a pooled investment vehicle that is privately
managed and often engages in active trading of various types of
securities and commodity futures and options;" and (2) "[one that
is exempt] from certain securities laws and regulations, including
the requirement to register as an investment company."2"
At the request of the Securities and Exchange Committee
("SEC"), the staff of the Commission's Division of Investment
Management and Office of Compliance Inspections and Examina-
tions "undertook a fact-finding mission aimed at reviewing the
operations and practices of hedge funds . 2 The SEC staff listed
the following characteristics of hedge funds: (1) "an entity that
holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets that does not
register its securities offerings under the Securities Act and which
19. Hedge Funds: Overview of Regulatory Oversight, Counterparty Risks, and
Investment Challenges: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, H.R., 111th Cong. 1 (2009)
(statement of Director of Financial Markets and Community Investment Orice M.
Williams), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO9677t.pdf.
20. DIVIDEND TAx ABUSE, supra note 4, at 13.
21. STAFF REP. TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, IMPLICATIONS OF
THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 3 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies-
hedgefunds0903.pdf.
22. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 2004).
23. Overview of Regulatory Oversight, supra note 19, at 1.
24. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 21, at viii.
1
362 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:3
is not registered as an investment company under the Investment
Company Act;" (2) "[they have a] fee structure, which compensates
the adviser based upon a percentage of the hedge fund's capital
gains and capital appreciation;" (3) "[their] hedge fund advisory
personnel often invest significant amounts of their own money
into the hedge funds that they manage;" and (4) "[many of them]
seek to achieve a positive, absolute return rather than measuring
their performance against a securities index or other
benchmark.125
B. The Issue of Tax Evasion and Cayman Islands
Hedge Funds
The Cayman Islands has the largest amount of hedge funds in
the world. As of October 10, 2009, the Cayman Islands Monetary
Authority26 listed 9,862 mutual funds as registered under the Cay-
man Islands Mutual Funds Law .2 1 Of the 9,862 mutual funds reg-
istered, "a vast majority of the funds" fall within the definition of a
hedge fund.2
Many of the hedge funds in the Cayman Islands are regis-
tered at the Ugland House, the center of a United States Govern-
ment Accountability Office investigation .29 The investigation was
conducted "to study what is known about the business activities of
25. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 21, at viii; see
Lartease Tiffith, Hedge Fund Regulation: What the FSA is Doing Right and Why the
SEC Should Follow the FSA's Lead, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 497, 499-500 (2007).
26. CAYMAN ISLANDS MONETARY AUTHORITY, OURm PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS (2009),
http://www.cimoney.com.ky/about - imaabout.aspx?id=66&ekmensel=e2f22c9a -10
30-btnlink (last visited Jan. 10, 2010) (describing the Cayman Islands Monetary
Authority's four principal functions as: 1) "[t~he issue and redemption of Cayman
Islands currency and the management of currency reserves;" 2) "[tlhe regulation and
supervision of financial services, the monitoring of compliance with money laundering
regulations, the issuance of a regulatory handbook on policies and procedures and the
issuance of rules and statements of principle and guidance;" 3) "[t~he provision of
assistance to overseas regulatory authorities, including the execution of memoranda
of understanding to assist with consolidated supervision;" and 4) "[tlhe provision of
advice to the Government, on monetary, regulatory and cooperative matters").
27. CAYMAN ISLANDS MONETARY AUTHORITY, LIST OF MUTUAL FUNDS REGISTERED/
LICENSED WITH THE CAYMAN ISLANS MONETARY AUTHORITY (2009), http://www.
cimoney.com.ky/StatsReg-Ent/stats-reg-ent.aspx?id=256&ekmiensel~e2f22c9a14-
84256_6 (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
28. CAYMAN ISLANDS MONETARY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT - 1 JULY1 2006 - 30
JUNE 2007 56 (2007), http://www.cimoney.com.ky/about -cima/about -feedra.aspx?id=
458&terms=,annual+report (stating that "[allthough Cayman Islands legislation
refers to 'mutual funds,' the vast majority of the funds registered in this jurisdiction
fall within the loose definition of a 'hedge fund'") (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
29. BUSINESS AND TAx ADvANTAGES, supra note 5.
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U.S. taxpayers involving Ugland House in the Cay-man Islands . 30
The investigation found "[miany of the 18,857 entities registered
at the Ugland House are U.S. connected""1 and Americans who do
business in the Cayman Islands do so to gain legal and illegal tax
advantages under U.S. law .12 It is estimated that thirty-eight per-
cent of the 18,857 entities using the Ugland House as an address
are hedge funds or private-equity funds .33 Thus, around 7,000 of
the 9,862 mutual funds registered under the Cayman Islands
Mutual Funds Law have a registered office at the Ugland House.
What then has led to the Cayman Islands' growth as a hedge fund
leader?
1. Reasons for the Cayman Islands Growth into Hedge
Fund Leader
The Cay-man Islands have benefited from a number of laws
and political characteristics. Part of the Cayman Islands' success
can be attributed to a stable political and economic environment."
Furthermore, the Cayman Islands has benefited from "Iiexcellent
infrastructure in terms of telecommunications and other utilities,
and a reliable air service."
Paul Byles, former head of policy at the Cayman Islands Mon-
etary Authority ("CIMA"), believes that the Cayman Islands' suc-
cess as a hedge fund venue can be best explained by the total
financial package the country offers .3 6 "[The] Cay-man Islands is
number one for structured finance; number one for hedge fund
registrations; number two for captive insurance; and the leading
offshore centre for banking. There is no other jurisdiction that
ranks so highly across so many different sectors . 3 Market leader-
ship in the various sectors stems from "excellent institutional and
physical infrastructure. ... designed to establish a flexible reguala-
tory environment that is suited to the complex needs of global cap-
ital and provides more efficient vehicles to manage the multi-
jurisdictional structure of complex international financial
30. BusiNass AND TAX ADVANTAGES, supra note 5, at 1.
31. BUSINESS AND TAx ADVANTAGES, supra note 5, at 10.
32. BusiN~ss ANDT TAx ADVANTAGES, supra note 5, at 26.
33. BusiNass AN TAx ADVANTAGES, supra, note 5, at 14.
34. James Eedes, Special Supplement: Cayman Islands - Offshore, On Target,
Boasting Top Institutional and Physical Infrastructures the Cayman Islands has
Grown to Become the World's Fifth Largest Financial Centre, THE BANKER, JUIY 1,
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transactions. 3
In reality, the Cayman Islands has grown into the fifth larg-
est banking center and largest hedge fund venue in the world
because of its lax banking, taxation, and mutual fund laws. These
laws have led to the characterization of the Cayman Islands as a
"tax haven.13 9 The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development ("OECD") has developed a list of four characteristics
that define a tax haven: "no or only nominal taxes, a lack of effec-
tive exchange of information, a lack of transparency, and no sub-
stantial activity (for example, investments that are purely tax
driven).""0 The following laws exhibit all four characteristics.
a. Banking Laws
In 1976, the Cayman Islands passed strong banking secrecy
laws, known as the Confidential Relationships Law.4" While bank-
ing secrecy laws have helped the financial industries in the Cay-
man Islands grow, the laws have also brought scrutiny due to the
"lack of effective exchange of information [and] lack of trans-
parency. . ."" The banking laws are the key reason why tax eva-
sion flourishes in the Cayman Islands.
The Confidential Relationships Law applies to "all confiden-
tial information with respect to business of a professional nature
which arises in or is brought into the islands and to all persons
coming into possession of such information at any time thereafter
..... 11 Confidential information is defined as information concern-
ing any property which the recipient thereof is not authorized by
the principal to divulge (other than in the normal course of busi-
ness)." However, the law does not apply to any professional per-
son acting in the normal course of business or with consent, a
constable of the rank of Inspector investigating an offense commit-
ted within the Cayman Islands. It also does not apply to an offense
that occurred outside the Cayman Islands but would be an offense
against its own laws, the Financial Secretary and the CIMA, or a
bank that finds it necessary to have the confidential information
38. Id.
39. Addison, supra note 4, at 719-21.
40. See Addison, supra note 4, at 705-06; OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: an
Emerging Global Issue, at 22 (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/
l904l76.pdf.
41. Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law (2009) (Cayman is.).
42. See Addison, supra note 4, at 706.
43. Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law § 3(l) (2009) (Cayman Is.).
44. Id. § 2.
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for the protection of the bank's interest."5
John M. Mathewson testified in front of a Senate subcommit-
tee about his experiences with the banking secrecy laws in the
Cayman Islands as sixty percent shareholder of an entity named
Guardian Bank, a Caymanian bank."6 Mr. Mathewson noted that
"the Cayman Islands has a confidentiality law whereby it is a
crime to divulge account information.""7 He further added
you can take it one step further by having a corporation ...
we provided directors for that corporation ... the individual
account-holder never had to sign anything or have his
name visible to anyone ... the only one who was aware that
this U.S. citizen . . . was the beneficial owner of a corpora-
tion was []Ithe Guardian Bank."~
A U.S. investor can open an account with a Cayman Islands bank,
create a corporation account and use that corporation to invest in
a hedge fund. The account information is then hidden from the
IRS and the only one who ever knows that the U.S. investor is
using a Cayman Islands corporation to invest and evade taxes is
the Cayman Islands bank.4 "
However, banking secrecy is not absolute in the Cayman
Islands. The Confidential Relationships Law has exceptions
where information may be divulged or obtained and also gives
directions regarding the seizure of confidential evidence. 0 The
Confidential Relationships Law also cross-references the Tax
Information Authority Law. The Tax Information Authority Law
applies for the purpose of the provision of information in taxation
matters on request to a scheduled country."' The Tax Information
Authority Law is a codification of the Tax Information Exchange
Agreements between the Cayman Islands and other countries."
b. Tax Laws
The tax laws in the Cayman Islands establish another charac-
45. Id. at § 3(2).
46. Role of U.S. Correspondent Banking, supra note 7.
47. Role of U.S. Correspondent Banking, supra note 7.
48. Role of U.S. Correspondent Banking, supra note 7.
49. TAX HAVEN BANKs AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 3, at 22-23
(explaining "know-your-customer" and Qualified Intermediary program and citing
one Liechtenstein bank that thought the practical effect of these programs "was to
preserve bank secrecy for non-U.S. accountholders, since the foreign financial
institution was under no obligation to disclose any client names").
50. Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law § 3(2, 4) (2009) (Cayman Is.).
51. Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law (2009) (Cayman Is.).
52. See discussion infra Section IIB.
5
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teristic of the OECD's definition of a tax haven: "no or only nomi-
nal taxes. 5 The Cayman Islands has no direct tax laws, "meaning
no income tax, no capital gains tax, no estate and inheritance tax,
and no taxes on financial transactions."" Thus, a corporation set
up as a hedge fund in the Cayman Islands only has to pay a fee to
set up the corporation, around $600 U.S., 55 and pay the annual
Mutual Funds Law fee.5" The hedge fund would then not have to
pay U.S. income tax or any of the other taxes attributable to an
American corporation.
c. Mutual Funds Law
The third law that contributes to the Cayman Islands' success
as a hedge fund venue is the Mutual Funds Law. In 1993, the Cay-
man Islands enacted the Mutual Funds Law and the hedge fund
industry has flourished ever since.5 " The Mutual Funds Law
defines a "mutual fund" as a "company, unit trust or partnership
that issues equity interests, the purpose or effect of which is the
pooling of investor funds with the aim of spreading investment
risks and enabling investors in the mutual fund to receive profits
or gains from the acquisition, holding, management or disposal of
investments."" This definition is broad and the "vast majority of
the funds registered in [the Cayman Islands] fall within the loose
definition of a 'hedge fund."' Providing investors with flexible
regulations, the Mutual Funds Law has enabled hedge funds to
thrive and hedge fund managers to be creative with investments.
The CIMA is the designated body that regulates hedge
funds.' 0 The CIMA's main duty is to grant and deny licenses of
mutual funds. Other CIMA duties include: general review of the
mutual fund business, issuing an annual report, supervision and
enforcement of the Mutual Funds Law, imposition of conditions on
Mutual Funds Licenses, appointment of a person to advise the
fund and to assume controls of a fund.6 " The CIMA provides hedge
funds with a regulatory body with well defined powers, providing
53. See Addison, supra note 4, at 705-06.
54. Eedes, supra note 34.
55. Busuis~ss AND TAx ADVANTAGES, supra note 5, at 27.
56. Mutual Funds Law, pt. II § 9 (2009) (Cayman Is.).
57. Eedes, supra note 34.
58. Mutual Funds Law, pt. I § 2 (2009) (Cayman Is.).
59. CAMAN ISLANDS MONETARY AUTrHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28.
60. Mutual Funds Law, pt.V § 29 (2009) (Cayman Is.).
61. Id.
366
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for an "effective regulatory regime. "612
Moreover, the Mutual Funds Law provides investors with "a
wide scope in terms of investment objectives and fund structure
while mandating full transparency."' The Mutual Funds Law pro-
vides transparency by requiring that funds file a "current offering
document."6' The Mutual Funds Law defines an offering document
as "describting] the equity interests in all material aspects; and
contain[ing] such other information as is necessary to enable a
prospective investor in the mutual fund to make an informed deci-
sion as to whether or not to subscribe for or purchase the equity
interests . 6 At the same time, investors have flexibility in their
investment objectives and fund structure .6 ' A fund's only struc-
tural requirements are that
each promoter is of sound reputation; the administration of
the mutual fund will be undertaken by persons who have
sufficient expertise . . . and by persons who are fit and
proper . .. and the business of the mutual fund and any
offer of equity interests in it will be carried out in a proper
way. 67
As seen above, the transparency requirement combined with
a broad definition of mutual fund, a well-defined regulatory body,
and limited constraints on investment objectives have lead to the
growth of the Cayman hedge fund industry. The regulatory
regime enacted through the Mutual Funds Law is "effective with-
out being intrusive. 66
2. Tax Evasion the IRS Could be Looking to Investigate
Domestically, hedge funds usually take on a limited partner-
ship or general partnership form.6 " Thus, the hedge fund is taxed
as a partnership and investors are viewed as limited partners.
The investors are then singularly taxed for federal income tax
purposes."0 The goal of the domestic hedge fund is to eliminate
62. Eedes, supra note 34.
63. Eedes, supra note 34.
64. Mutual Funds Law, pt. II § 4 (2009) (Cayman Is.).
65. Mutual Funds Law, pt. II § 4(6) (2009) (Cayman Is.).
66. See Eedes, supra note 34.
67. Mutual Funds Law, pt. 11 § 5(2) (2009) (Cayman Is.).
68. Eedes, supra note 34.
69. Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS
Bus. L.J. 323, 364-67 (2007).
70. IMPLICATIONS OF=TH GROWTH OF HEDGE FuNns, supra note 21, at 9 ("[llncome
is taxed only at the level of the individual investor.").
67
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being taxed as a corporation or a publicly traded partnership to
avoid double taxation."1 "Typically, a hedge fund falls within the
'private placement' safe harbor for avoiding classification as a
publicly traded partnership.""2
However, many U.S. hedge funds have begun to associate
themselves with offshore hedge funds .1 3 These offshore hedge
funds are located in places like the Cayman Islands. "An offshore
hedge fund is not a U.S. person for federal income tax purposes. 7
Many offshore hedge funds are organized as foreign partnerships
or corporations and do not file U.S. tax returns." These offshore
hedge funds are suspected of contributing to U.S. tax evasion in a
number of ways.
a. Dividend Tax Abuse
The main abuse that the U.S. government believes is taking
place in Cayman Islands hedge funds is dividend tax abuse. "A
dividend is a distribution by a corporation of a portion of its earn-
ings to its stockholders, with the amount distributed based upon
the number of shares held by each stockholder."" The total
amount of dividends paid to the stockholder for the given year
must be reported to the IRS and the stockholder must report all
dividends received on their tax return. 7 The individual tax rate on
the dividends paid to a U.S. person is fifteen percent.
U.S. tax law differs with its treatment of dividends paid to
non-U.S. persons." Non-U.S. persons are subject to a tax rate of
thirty percent on the dividend payment and the thirty percent is
71. Alan L. Kennard, The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAx LAwYER
133, 139 (2003).
72. Id.; I.R.C. § 7704(b) (2008).
73. DIVIDEND TAx ABUSE, supra note 4, at 14.
74. Ordower, supra note 69, at 362.
75. DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE, supra note 4, at 14.
76. DIVIDEND TAx ABUSE, supra note 4, at 11.
77. DIVIDEND TAx ABUSE, supra note 4; I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(A) (2004).
78. The following tax laws apply to countries that do not have a tax treaty with
the United States which set a lower rate of withholding tax. DIVIDEND TAx ABUSE,
supra note 4, at 11. Further, "if the withholding agent is a non-U.S. financial
institution operating outside the United States, other rules apply, including in some
cases Qualified Intermediary agreement[s] which may specify different disclosure
obligations." DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE, supra note 4, at 12. However, the GAO report does
not state that the Cayman Islands have any similar agreement with the United
States that would lessen the withholding tax. See BUSINESS AND TAX ADVANTAGES,
supra note 5. Furthermore, the report gives six case histories to illustrate dividend
tax abuse and three of the cases used the Cayman Islands to evade a thirty percent
withholding tax. Busuvss AuN TAx ADVANTAGES, supra note 5.
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required to be "withheld at the source" of the dividend payment."9
U.S. tax law defines the "withholding agent" as any person that
has "control, receipt, custody, disposal, or payment of any item of
income of a foreign person that is subject to withholding. "'0 In
2003, "about $42 billion in U.S. stock dividends were paid to non-
U.S. corporations, from which only about 4.5% or $1.9 billion was
withheld."18 '
In November 1997, the IRS issued Notice 97-66.11 This notice
created confusion and allowed financial institutions to aggres-
sively interpret the taxation laws regarding substitute dividend
payments.8 " By interpreting Notice 97-66 aggressively, financial
institutions concluded that substitute dividend payments regard-
ing foreign-to-foreign parties were not subject to any withholding
tax.8 The process works where a U.S. financial institution sets up
an offshore corporation or uses a pre-existing offshore corporation
that it owns and controls to borrow U.S. stock from an offshore
client anticipating a dividend payment.",' Next, the offshore corpo-
ration could sell the stock, so it would not pay a dividend itself,
and "simultaneously enter[]I into a swap agreement with its affili-
ated financial institution.18 6 Following issuance of the dividend,
the financial institution could pay "a tax-free 'dividend equivalent'
payment under the swap agreement to the offshore corporation
which, in turn, paid the same amount back to the offshore client
from which it had borrowed stock. 817 The substitute dividend pay-
ment would then be between two foreign parties. Financial insti-
tutions claim that these substitute payments regarding foreign-to-
foreign parties are not subject to withholding tax.
The U.S. government believes that these abusive practices
involve sophisticatd transactions such as dividend related swap88
79. DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE, supra note 4, at 11; J.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2008)
(amended 2010); I.R.C. § 881(a)(1) (amended 2010); I.R.C. § 1441(a, b) (2005); I.R.C.
§ 1442(a) (2005).
80. DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE, supra note 4, at 12.
81. DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE, supra note 4, at 13.
82. I.R.S. Notice 97-66, 1997-2 C.B. 328, 1997, available at WL 701873.
83. DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE, supra note 4, at 19-20.
84. DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE, supra note 4, at 19.
85. DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE, supra note 4, at 20.
86. DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE, supra note 4, at 20.
87. DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE, supra note 4, at 20.
88. See JOINTr COMMITTEE ON TAXATION: DESCRiPrION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDEN~s FISCAL. YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL, 111TH CONG.,
15-17 (Comm. Print 2009), 2009, reprinted in WL 2996018 (explaining swap
transactions).
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and loan transactions,"9 among other things. 0 The financial insti-
tutions structure the swap and loan transactions to enable their
non-U.S. clients "to enjoy all the benefits of owning shares of U.S.
stock, including receiving dividends, without paying the tax appli-
cable to those dividends."" In effect, the financial institutions are
"investing synthetically through equity swaps192 allowing for the
same dividend returns as a stock and "disguising who owns the
stock in order to help their offshore hedge fund clients avoid with-
holding the tax."193 The investors in the offshore hedge funds could
be non-U.S. persons or corporations set up abroad to disguise that
they are U.S. persons.
The IRS most likely believes that these practices are the pri-
mary tax evasion tools utilized in the Cayman Islands. A tax law-
yer at Greenburg Traurig, Mark H. Leeds, recently stated that the
IRS increasingly viewed equity swaps as "evidence of tax avoid-
ance."' Losses caused by dividend tax abuse is unknown; how-
ever, Lehman Brothers estimated that $115 million was lost in
2004 alone.9
b. Individual Tax Evasion
Other investors in the Cayman Islands evade taxes through
complex schemes meant to hide the true investor. "When an indi-
vidual or corporation conducts business in the Cayman Islands,
there is often no third-party reporting of transactions, so the accu-
racy of the disclosures to U.S. regulators is depended on the accu-
racy and completeness of the self-disclosure."" Thus, individuals
can set up shell corporations in the Cayman Islands and a bank
account in the Cayman Islands for the corporation so that the cor-
poration is protected under the bank secrecy laws.9 " The individ-
ual can then invest in Cayman Islands hedge funds through the
corporate bank account. By operating as a foreign person or a shell
corporation, the U.S. person can evade taxes on U.S. source
income because the U.S. does not withhold taxes on sources such
89. See id. at 17-21 (explaining loan transactions).
90. See DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE, supra note 4, at 13-22.
91. DIVIDEND TA~X ABUSE, supra note 4, at 3.
92. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 89, at 5.
93. Lynnley Browning, Banks' Derivatives Activity Falls Under I.R.S. Scrutiny,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at B4, available at WLNR 1265790.
94. Id.
95. DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE, supra note 4, at 34 & n.113.
96. BUSINESS AND TAX ADVANTAGES, supra note 5, at 5.
97. See discussion supra Section II(B)(1)(a).
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as interest and capital gains paid to foreigners."' "If a U.S. person
can arrange to receive investment income through means that
permit the U.S. person to appear to be a foreign person, the U.S.
investor may be able to evade U.S. income tax entirely." 9 This is
typified by the UBS v. IRS case where UBS helped facilitate tax
evasion with U.S. clients.
III. TAx EVASION: HISTORICAL. ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND CAYMAN ISLANDS
Reacting to billions lost in tax revenue, the U.S. and OECD
have targeted tax havens in an attempt to curb tax evasion. The
efforts, though, have been largely unsuccessful. 100 Instead, capital
has continued to move freely between the U.S. and tax havens
such as the Cayman Islands.
A. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development
The OECD was founded in 1961 as an intergovernmental
organization dedicated to promoting democracy and free market
economy around the world."0' The OECD states that it "provides a
setting where governments compare policy experiences, seek
answers to common problems, identify good practice and coordi-
nate domestic and international policies." 02 In 1998, the OECD
began a "shame campaign against tax havens" with the publica-
tion of "Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue."103
Within the publication, the OECD listed four characteristics that
define a tax haven.' It also announced that "a future report
would include all states it considered uncooperative tax havens"
but would remove any tax haven from its list "if the tax haven
pledged to reduce and eventually eliminate policies the OECD
considered harmful. 0  As an example, according to the OECD,
98. JANE G. GRAVELLE, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAx AVOIDANCE AND) EVASION
19 (2009), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40623-20090709.pdf.
99. S. COMM. ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, TAx COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO OFFSHORE
ACCOUNTS AND ENTITIES (2009), http:/wwwjct.gov/x-23-09.pff.
100. Addison, supra note 4, at 704.
101. OECD, About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en-36734052_3673410
3_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
102. Id.
103. Addison, supra note 4, at 714.
104. Addison, supra note 4, at 705-6, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging
Global Issue, supra note 41.
105. Addison, supra note 4, at 714.
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the Cayman Islands committed to the OECD and is considered a
cooperative tax haven.106
The OECD's promise to remove any tax haven who pledged to
reduce and eventually eliminate harmful policies required only
"symbolic statements" that these tax havens vowed to change.0 17
The OECD provided no economic incentives but instead offered a
country the opportunity to be left off of a list that could potentially
bring negative marketing.' "As a result . .. key member states,
including the U.S., withdrew their support and the cooperation
commitment agreement with tax havens systematically fell
apart." 09 Thus, the OECD's publication and cooperation commit-
ment did little more than raise global awareness.
B. Tax In formation Exchange Agreements
With this in mind, the U.S. began adopting Tax Information
Exchange Agreements ("TIEA")."0 TIEAs can typically be defined
by three characteristics: 1) "provide for the exchange of informa-
tion on requests for both criminal and civil tax matters;" 2) "pro-
vide for the exchange of information even if such information
relates to a person who is not a resident or national of the U.S. or
a TIEA partner;" and 3) "provide for the disclosure of information
regardless of local confidentiality laws that may prohibit such dis-
closure, including laws relating to bank secrecy or bearer
shares.""'
Within the last ten years, the U.S. has entered into TIEAs
with fourteen countries."12 Following their pledge to the OECD to
reduce and eliminate harmful policies, the Cayman Islands
entered into a TIEA with the U.S. in 2001."'1 This TIEA was codi-
fied in the Tax Information Authority Law in the Cayman
106. OECD, THE OECD's PROJECT ON HARmFUL TAR PRACTICES: THE 2001
PROGRESS REPORT 8 (2001), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/28/2664438.pdf.
107. Addison, supra note 4, at 715.
108. Addison, supra note 4, at 7 14-15.
109. Addison, supra note 4, at 716.
110. Addison, supra note 4, at 717.
111. Addison, supra note 4, at 717 (citing Press Release, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Testimony of Treasury Acting International Tax Counsel John Harrington
Before the Senate Finance Committee on Offshore Tax Evasion).
112. Addison, supra note 4, at 717.
113. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Secretary O'Neill's
Signing Ceremony Statement: United States and United Kingdom Sign Agreement to
Exchange Information with Respect to the Cayman Islands (Nov. 27, 2001), available
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po823.htm.
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Islands."'4 The Tax Information Authority Law was most recently
revised in July, 2009.115 The agreement has been criticized
because it applies "only if the IRS has a valid reason for sus-
pecting a specific taxpayer of criminal tax evasion.""' 6 It requires
the IRS to provide the Cayman Islands Tax Information Authority
with: the identity of the tax payer under investigation, the nature
of the information requested, purpose for which the information is
sought, reasonable grounds for believing the information is in the
Cayman Islands, the name and address of any person believed to
be in possession of the information, and a declaration that the
information would be obtainable in the U.S. under its laws. 1
These requirements make it appear that "the value of information
exchange is primarily limited to confirmation rather than discov-
ery of tax evasion. ""' The Cayman Islands government has even
publicly stated that the agreement "eliminate [s] fishing
expeditions."'19
IV. IRS v. UBS
Despite the IRS' frustrations utilizing the OECD and TIEAs,
it has recently made progress in targeting tax evaders through the
"John Doe" summons process. Recently, it entered into a settle-
ment agreement with Switzerland-based UBS. 2 0 The IRS filed a
"John Doe" summons"' on the UBS bank to request information
regarding U.S. taxpayers who may be using Swiss bank accounts
to evade federal income taxes.' 2 This was especially important for
Cayman Islands hedge funds and their investors because the IRS
similarly suspects hedge fund corporations and their investors of
114. See Tax Information Authority Law (2009) (Cayman Is.), available at http://
www.tia.gov.ky/pdf/TaxInformation-.Authority_.Law_(2009_.Revision).pdf
[hereinafter Cayman Tax Law].
115. Id.
116. Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
443, 501 n.254 (2007); See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 962.
117. Tax Information Authority Law, pt. IV § 11(3) (2009) (Cayman Is.).
118. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 961.
119. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 962.
120. Settlement Agreement, supra note 1.
121. Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REv. 1,
63-79 (2004) (analyzing the evolution of third party summonses into the inquisitorial
"John Doe" summons).
122. See IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL - 34.6.3 SUMMONS ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS, http://www.irs.gov/irm/part34/irm-34-006-003.html (last visited Jan. 11,
2010).
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evading federal income taxes."' 3
A. United States Turns Attention to UBS
Following UBS v. IRS, IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman
stated that I] nternational tax evasion will continue to be a top
priority.1124 The IRS seeks to work with other countries and the
Justice Department.2 2' The increased focus of the IRS on an issue
that has been a problem for years can be attributed to a number of
factors.
First, Senator Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, has increased awareness of the issue with hear-
ings on offshore tax havens, banks and accounts. Senator Levin
has followed these hearings with proposed legislation addressing
these problems. 2 6 During the past two years, the subcommittee
investigative hearings have focused on how U.S. taxpayers use off-
shore tax havens to hide assets and evade taxes. While the hear-
ings are not the first of their kind, they 12 1 take a fresh and detailed
approach to investigating how and why U.S. taxpayers are able to
evade taxes abroad. As part of these efforts, investigations into
the extent tax haven banks have assisted U.S. taxpayers, the
extent to which tax haven banks have manipulated the Qualified
Intermediary Program 128 n o .. bnshv aiiae
IntemedaryProram an ho U.. bnkshav failiatethese processes have occurred. 2
123. See Jenny Strasburg & Jesse Drucker, IRS Steps Up Scrutiny of Offshore
Funds, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB1245
88728596150643.html; Ronal D. Orol, IRS Could Target Off-Shore Hedge-Fund
Investors Next, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB125 113164822654187.html.
124. Remarks by IRS Commissioner Shulman, supra note 2.
125. Cutler, supra note 14.
126. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http:ll
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=llllong-bills&docid=f-.s5O6is.
txt.pdf.
127. See, e.g., TAx HAVEN ABlUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS, AND SECRECY BEFORE
THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 109th Cong. (2006); U.S. TAX
SHELTER INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAwYERS, AND) FINANCIAL
PROFESSIONALS BEFORE THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 108th Cong.
(2003); WHMAT IS THE U.S. POSITION ON OFFSHORE TAX HAVENS? BEFORE THE
PERMANENT SIJBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 107th Cong. (2001); CRIME AND SECRECY:
THE USE OF OFFSHORE BANKS ANDm COMPANIES BEFORE THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, 98th Cong. (1983).
128. See Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax
Evasion, 123 TAX NOTES 264, 265-7 (explaining the IRS Qualified Intermediary
Program).
129. See TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 3; See DIVIDEND
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Second, in February 2008, "a former employee of a Liechten-
stein trust company provided tax authorities around the world
with data on about 1,400 persons with accounts at LGT Bank in
Liechtenstein."' The result was an IRS announcement that it
had begun enforcement actions against more than 100 U.S. tax-
payers holding Liechtenstein accounts."3 ' Senator Levin's cause
and the subcommittee's investigative hearings and reports were
strengthened by a global issue appearing on news feeds daily.
Finally, in May 2008, a second global tax scandal surfaced
when a private banker formerly employed by UBS AG, Bradley
Birkenfleld was arrested by American authorities on charges of
"having conspired with a U.S. citizen and a business associate to
defraud the IRS of $7.2 million in taxes owed on $200 million of
assets hidden in offshore accounts in Switzerland and Liechent-
stein. 3 He pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States,
marking the "first time that the United States criminally prose-
cuted a Swiss banker for helping a U.S. taxpayer evade payment
of U.S. taxes."' 33 Following Mr. Birkenfield's arrest and subse-
quent plea, UBS entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement
(DPA), admitting it helped U.S. taxpayers evade taxes, and agree-
ing to pay $780 million to the U.S. government.'
All of these incidents have come at the most opportune time
for the IRS. The IRS has a supportive political party in place that
backs an international tax evasion focus. 135 Furthermore, the IRS
is recovering millions of dollars that could help a cash pinched
administration. 3 6
B. United States Action
On June 30, 2008, the IRS filed a petition for leave to serve
"John Doe" summonses on U.S. taxpayers who had accounts with
UBS in the Southern District of Florida. 3 ' The "John Doe" sum-
TAX ABUSE: How OFFSHORE ENTITIES DODGE TAXEs ON U.S. STOCK DIVIDENDS, supra
note 4.
130. TAX HAVEN BuAKS ANDm U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 3, at 2.
131. TAX HAVEN BANKS AN U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 3, at 2.
132. TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 3, at 2.
133. TAX HAVEN BANKIS AuN U.S. TAx COMPLIANCE, supra note 3, at 3.
134. Martha Brannigan, Federal Taxes: IRS Agents Hunting Offshore Tax Cheats,
MiAi HERALD, Apr. 28, 2009, at Cl, reprinted in 2009 WLNR 7958010.
135. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 960 (demonstrating that during the presidency of
George W. Bush, conservatives fiercely opposed OECD efforts to curb international
tax evasion).
136. Brannigan, supra note 134.
137. Ex Parte Pet. for Leave to Serve John Doe Summ. to U.S. Taxpayers not Filing
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monses were filed pursuant to Sections 7402(a), 7609(f) and
7609(h) of the Internal Revenue Code.138 Section 7609 permits ser-
vice after a court proceeding determines that there is 1) an "ascer-
tainable group or class of persons," 2) reasonable basis to believe
the group may be violating tax laws, and 3) inability to procure
information through alternate means. 3 On July 1, 2008, U.S. Dis-
trict Court Judge Joan A. Lenard authorized the IRS to serve the
"John Doe" summons on UBS. 4 1 The summons directed "UBS to
produce records identifying U.S. taxpayers with accounts at UBS
in Switzerland who elected to have their accounts remain hidden
from the IRS ."14 1
On July 21, 2008, Internal Revenue Agent Arthur S. Brake
issued the "John Doe" summons to UBS.'4 The summons directed
UBS to appear before the IRS on August 8, 2008 to "give testi-
mony and produce for examination, certain books, papers, or other
data as described in the summons. 3 Separate from the "John
Doe" summons, UBS entered into a DPA with the U.S.'"4 The DPA
was in response to the IRS charging UBS with "participating in a
conspiracy to defraud the United States and its agency the IRS in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 37 1.11141 UBS agreed to pay the U.S. $780
million, provide the government with the identities and account
information of certain U.S. clients and recognize that the DPA did
not prevent any claims or defenses in the "John Doe" summons.4
The next day, the IRS filed a petition to enforce the "John Doe"
summons claiming that UBS had failed to respond by not appear-
ing on August 8, 2008.'~
C. Swiss and UBS Reaction
In response to the petition to enforce the "John Doe" sum-
Forms W-9 or 1099 on Accounts at UBS AG, Subsidiaries, Affiliates, United States v.
UBS AG, No. 08-21864 U (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2008).
138. See I.R.C. § 7609 (2005); I.R.C. § 7402 (1972).
139. I.R.C. § 7609 (f).
140. Press Release, Department of Justice, Federal Judge Approves IRS Summons
for UBS Swiss Bank Account Records (July 1, 2008), available at http://www.justice.
gov/tax/txdv08584.htm.
141. Id.
142. Pet, to Enforce John Doe Summons T 9, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-
20423 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2009).
143. Id.
144. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2009).
145. Id. 1.
146. Id. 3.
147. Pet, to Enforce John Doe Summons, supra note 142, 11.
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mons, the Swiss government filed an amicus brief"' accusing the
U.S. government of violating a U.S. -Switzerland bilateral tax
treaty.' The "John Doe" summons was criticized for not being
supported by evidence. 15 0 In its amicus brief, Switzerland stated
that "the Tax Treaty',". ... does not authorize 'fishing expeditions'
such as the summons at issue in this case. . . [and] that a request
for information should include some degree of specificity." 5 '
Switzerland also cited their bank secrecy laws and accused
the U.S. government of infringing on its sovereignty. "Switzer-
land's laws prohibit the release of confidential information to for-
eign governments when the request has not been made through
authorized intergovernmental channels."' The brief further
argued that "if the Court were to order UBS to produce evidence
from Switzerland, and backed that order with coercive powers, the
Court would be substituting its own authority for that of the com-
petent Swiss authorities, and therefore would violate Swiss sover-
eignty and international law."' In particular, the Swiss
government argued that forcing UBS to release confidential infor-
mation would violate Swiss secrecy laws and could lead to crimi-
nal convictions.
After the IRS filed for leave to serve the "John Doe" summons,
the Swiss government entered into talks with the U.S. govern-
ment to "broaden the scope of treaty requests to which Switzer-
land can reply.""55 The first meeting was held on April 28, 2009,
and the Swiss government sent a diplomatic note the next day set-
ting forth "its concerns regarding the threat this case poses to the
negotiation of the proposed amendments to the Tax Treaty."'
148. Brief for Switzerland as Amici Curiae with Letter to U.S. State Department,
United States v. UBS AG, No.09-20423 (S.D. Fin. Apr. 30, 2009) [hereinafter
Switzerland Amicus Br.].
149. Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income,
U.S.-Switz., Oct. 2, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-8 [hereinafter US-Swiss Treaty].
150. Switzerland Amicus Br., supra note 148.
151. US-Swiss Treaty, supra note 149 (updating the 1951 income tax treaty
between the United States and Switzerland).
152. Switzerland Amicus Br., supra note 148, Argument § III.
153. Switzerland Ainicus Br., supra note 148, Argument § IL.
154. Switzerland Amicus Br., supra note 148, Argument § 11.
155. Judge Asks if IRS Summons Against UBS Represents Obama Administration's
Position, DAILY TAx REPORT, May 12, 2009, available at http://daytona.law.miami.
edu:2346/btac/T11100/split -display.adp?fedfid=12373537&vname=dtrnot&wsn=5375
08000&searchid= 10107455&doctypeid= 13&type=date&mode~doc&split=&scm=T1 1
100&pg=0.
156. Switzerland Amicus Br., supra note 148, Statement of Relevant Facts § E.
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D. United States Right to Enforce "John Doe"
Summons
Despite the Swiss government's objections, the IRS pushed
forward with the "John Doe" summons. On April 30, 2009, UBS
submitted its own brief opposing the petition to enforce the "John
Doe" summons.' The IRS responded by arguing that Congress
had given the IRS broad summons authority, that the U.S. had
proven a prima facie case to enforce the "John Doe" summons and
that international comity favored enforcement."'
Responding to Switzerland's amicus brief, the IRS argued
that it has broad summons authority and that the "John Doe"
summons should be enforced.' The IRS also cited the Supreme
Court's approval of the "John Doe" summons process under I.R.C.
§ 7602(a) (2008) .160 Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in
Bisceglia, Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1976 governing
third party summonses, specifically, "John Doe" summonses.''
The IRS argued that the Supreme Court's decision, coupled with
legislation, affirmed that the IRS has "broad and expansive sum-
mons power." Moreover, the IRS claimed that they met the ele-
ments required under I.R.C. § 7609(f) (2005).'16 2 The IRS also
argued that "if a party fails or refuses to comply with a summons,
the United States may file an action to compel compliance. 6  Fil-
ing an action to compel compliance, the IRS asserted that it had
established a prima facie case for enforcement by proving four
necessary elements: "the summons was issued for a legitimate
purpose; the summoned information may be relevant to that pur-
pose; the summoned information is not already in the possession
of the [IRS]; and the IRS has complied with all the administrative
157. Switzerland Says IRS Summons Against UBS Violates Tax Treaty, Threatens




158. Memo Supporting Petition to Enforce 'John Doe' Summons, United States v.
UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (June 30, 2009).
159. Id.
160. Id.; see United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 156 (1975).
161. Camp, supra note 121, at 63-7 1 (describing Congress' enactment of § 7609(f)
and (h) which lay out three elements that must be met by the IRS to issue a "John
Doe" summons); Memo Supporting Petition to Enforce 'John Doe' Summons, supra
note 158, Argument § 1.
162. Memo Supporting Petition to Enforce 'John Doe' Summons, supra note 158,
Argument § L.
163. Memo Supporting Petition to Enforce 'John Doe' Summons, supra note 158, at
Argument § II; see also I.R.C. § 7604(b) (1988).
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requirements of the [IRS] .""~
If a party refuses to comply with the "John Doe" summons, a
court can hold the party in contempt and impose sanctions."' 5 The
IRS cited two Eleventh Circuit decisions affirming district court
contempt sanctions where the U.S. attempted to obtain informa-
tion located abroad from banks to prove that this case fell within
settled U.S. law."~ Moreover, the IRS concluded that the court
would not be abusing its powers by enforcing the summons. 1 7
E. Settlement Agreement
The U.S. government's response to Switzerland's amicus brief
sparked a number of responses by the Swiss Government, the IRS
and UBS. 6 5 Finally, on August 12, 2009, the U.S. and UBS
announced that they had settled the ongoing litigation, ending
their year-long battle. 6 Pursuant to the settlement agreement,
UBS agreed to produce account information concerning approxi-
mately 4,450 accounts to the Swiss Federal Tax Administration on
a rolling basis. 70 Additionally, the United States and the Swiss
Confederation also "agreed on an information exchange mecha-
164. Memo Supporting Petition to Enforce 'John Doe' Summons, supra note 158,
Argument § 11; see also United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).
165. Memo Supporting Petition to Enforce 'John Doe' Summons, supra note 158, at
Argument § III.
166. In re Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982) (affirming the
district court's contempt sanctions where a foreign bank refused to comply with a
grand jury subpoena because the records were located in a jurisdiction where banking
privacy laws existed); In re Grand Jury Proceedings: Union Bank of Switzerland v.
United States, 946 F.2d 904 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming the district court holding UBS
in contempt of court and rejecting UBS argument that UBS Panama was not subject
to the in personam jurisdiction of the U.S. courts).
167. Memo Supporting Petition to Enforce 'John Doe' Summons, supra note 158,
Argument § III.
168. See UBS AG Mot., United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. June 30,
2009) (seeking an order requiring the government to disclose the number of accounts
already identified through alternative means); United States Response to UBS AG
Motion, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. July 6, 2009) (opposing
UBS AG motion seeking an order requiring U.S. to answer interrogatories); Swiss
Government's Amicus Curiae Brief, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla.
July 7, 2009) (responding to IRS memo supporting the enforcement of the "John Doe"
summons); United States Supplemental Response to UBS AG Reply, United States v.
UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. July 12, 2009); United States Response to
Switzerland Memo, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. July 12, 2009).
169. J.P. Finet, DOJ Announces Settlement With UBS; Final Terms of Agreement
Not Released, DAILY T~x REPoRT, Aug. 13, 2009, available at http://bnataxreport.com
(follow Daily Tax Report: News Archive; then follow August 13, 2009; then follow Tax
Decisions & Rulings; then follow Financial Institutions: DOJ Announces Settlement
with UBS; Final Terms of Agreement Not Released).
170. Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, 3.
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nism that is intended to achieve the U.S. tax compliance goals of
the UBS summons while also respecting Swiss sovereignty."''
The separate agreement between the U.S. and Swiss Confedera-
tion allows for the exchange to be processed as a treaty
request.'Moreover, UBS was required to send out notices to U.S.
persons whose accounts were subject to the treaty request, notify-
ing that their information would be provided to the IRS.' Within
the notices, UBS was required to encourage each U.S. person to
consult with a qualified tax consultant and take advantage of the
IRS' Voluntary Disclosure Practice.7 14 However, the IRS set the
voluntary disclosure deadline at September 23 (later extended to
October 15),~ and stated that once the Swiss government sent the
U.S. government a name, the individual is no longer eligible.7
The U.S. claims that it got what it wanted all along: "access to
information about those UBS account holders most likely to have
been involved in offshore tax evasion."'177 In addition, the U.S. gov-
ernment scared more than 14,700 people into coming forward to
report offshore accounts during the 60-day amnesty program that
ended October 15.17 IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman said that
the overseas accounts reported ranged from $10,000 to more than
$100 million. 7 9 He added that the amnesty program probably
brought back into the U.S. tax system anywhere from $7.5 billion
to $15 billion in taxable assets. 8 1
In the meantime, the Swiss courts have ruled against the
executive branch deal with the U.S. On January 21, 2010, Swit-
zerland's Federal Administrative Court made its first decision to
prevent disclosure.'"' More recently, the Court ruled in favor of
171. Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl.
172. Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl.; see Lee A. Sheppard, Getting
Serious About Offshore Evasion?, 125 TAX NOTES 493, 494 (2009).
173. Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, T 3; see Remarks by IRS Commissioner
Shulman, supra note 2.
174. Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, 3-4.
175. Press Release, IRS, IRS Extends Deadline for Taxpayers to Voluntarily
Disclose Offshore Assets (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
article/0,,id=213463,00.html.
176. Remarks by IRS Commissioner Shulman, supra note 2.
177. Remarks by IRS Commissioner Shulman, supra note 2, at 2.
178. Joyce Cutler, Still Time to Report Offshore Account as Focus Stays




179. Cutler, supra note 14.
180. Cutler, supra note 14.
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two UBS clients who objected to their information being handed
over to the IRS. In its most recent ruling, the Court ruled that
"there were no reasons provided to show that this case differs from
January's test case, which is why the complaint is approved. 8
The Swiss Court held that "Switzerland could lift bank secrecy
laws only when there was evidence of tax fraud."'8 ' It also rea-
soned that failing to complete tax forms or declare income was not
evidence of tax fraud, but rather tax evasion. 84 Since these deci-
sions, the Swiss government has attempted to get Parliament to
approve the agreement."' 5 Presently, the agreement has stalled
and faces major obstacles.
V. IRS v. CAYMAN ISLANDS?
The Cayman Islands attracts a large number of U.S. investors
to hedge funds. These investments are legitimate in some circum-
stances but can also be for the purposes of tax evasion."18 Past
practices by the IRS have failed to curtail tax evasion. 8 ' However,
with the new and seemingly improved focus of the IRS on interna-
tional enforcement, the Cayman Islands hedge funds seem like a
logical place for the IRS to make its next "big move."' 8 Yet, the
"John Doe" summons the IRS employed in UBS v. IRS has still not
been approved by Swiss courts. Nevertheless, the IRS has given
hedge fund investors in the Cayman Islands an opportunity to
come clean before the IRS "knock[s] on your door."'
A. No New Treaty was Signed with Switzerland
What is notable in the UBS v. IRS settlement, is that a new
treaty was signed for the exchange of names. 90 This is important
because it shows that the tax treaty already in place between the
182. Katharina Bart, Update: Swiss Court Backs UBS Clients Against Data
Handover, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-
CO-20100226-71 1216.html?mod=WSJlIatestheadlines.
183. Bloomberg News, supra note 17.
184. Bloomberg News, supra note 17.
185. Catherine Bosley, Swiss Party Against Approval of UBS Deal with Swiss,
REUTERS, Mar. 9, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USL
DE6282GJ20100309.
186. See Sheppard & Sullivan, supra note 6 (stating that offshore hedge funds offer
opportunities for tax evasion).
187. See discussion supra Part III.
188. Strasburg & Drucker, supra note 123; Orol, supra note 123.
189. Brannigan, supra note 134.
190. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 1.
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two countries was not changed.' 9' Currently, Swiss courts will not
approve of disclosure through the agreement because most of the
account holders participated in tax evasion and not tax fraud. 19 2
Their interpretation of the current Tax Treaty' allows for
exchange of information only when there is tax fraud. The previ-
ous relationship between the Swiss and American governments
permitted tax evasion to flourish in Switzerland and yet, that
relationship is the status quo. Legally and structurally, nothing
changed the way the U.S. attacks international tax evasion.9 No
new legislation was passed in the United States.
Thus, the settlement means nothing more than a single inci-
dent of tax evasion thwarted by the IRS. The United States found
a bank that admitted to aiding U.S. taxpayers evade taxes and a
country that supported its bank doing this. Yet the U.S. only
received 4,000 names and a $780 million settlement from the
bank.' It was a historic victory for the IRS but not a "major step"
toward stopping international tax evasion. UBS was allowed to
keep its banking and securities licenses and was allowed to
remain in the Qualified Intermediary 9 6 Program.9 17 Meanwhile,
the Swiss government gets to keep banking secrecy."9 ' The settle-
ment was not a failure by any means. However, if the top priority
is stopping international tax evasion,' the focus should be on
changing the legal and structural elements that allow for tax
evasion.
The only way for the U.S. government to combat international
tax evasion is by changing its own rules. There are a number of
legislative proposals in Washington that could change the land-
scape of international tax evasion."0 The Stop Tax Haven Abuse
Act, proposed by Senator Levin, is one piece of legislation that
Congress is currently debating. The Act would subject hedge
191. See US-Swiss Treaty, supra note 149.
192. U.s.- UBS Deal is Undermined by Swiss Ruling, supra note 17.
193. US-Swiss Treaty, supra note 149.
194. Sheppard, supra note 172, at 494.
195. Wayne Tompkins, UBS to Divulge 4,450 Account Names, More Expected,
DAILY Bus. REV., Aug. 19, 2009.
196. Sullivan, supra note 128.
197. Sheppard, supra note 172, at 494.
198. Katharina Bart, Update: Swiss Govt Backs Bank Privacy; Mulls Withholding
Tax, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009.
199. Remarks by IRS Commissioner Shulman, supra note 2.
200. See Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111Ith Cong. (2009), available at httpi/
fi-webgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=ll1llong~bills&docid=fs5O6is.
txt.pdf; Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2009, H.R. 3933, 111th Cong. (2009),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?clll1:H.R.3933:.
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funds to money laundering laws, 0 increase fines for those who
failed to report offshore accounts, strengthen the "John Doe" sum-
mons process, determine offshore secrecy jurisdictions (including
the Cayman Islands), and increase reporting requirements for off-
shore banks and securities firms .202 The Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act introduced by House Ways and Means Committee
Chair Charles Rangel would also change the current legal and
structural elements permitting international tax evasion. 03 "The
main thrust of the bill is to require foreign banks to monitor tax
evasion by U.S. residents . 2 2" The proposed bill gives foreign banks
a choice: either help make bank secrecy a relic of the past or have
access to our capital markets impeded. 0 Legislation is the only
way for the U.S. to truly make the statement that tax evasion and
bank secrecy must end.
B. Switzerland is an Entirely Different Scenario than
Cayman Islands Hedge Funds
Another reason why legislation is the best route is that the
means by which the IRS was able to achieve its goals in Switzer-
land might not work in other tax havens. It is crucial to focus on
the circumstances that led to the "John Doe" summons and subse-
quent settlement. Because of the unique circumstances that were
present in the UBS v. IRS case, the U.S. could not apply the same
methods it did in that case to Cayman Islands hedge funds. There
are a number of reasons why the "John Doe" summons employed
in the UBS case would not be feasible in the case of the Cayman
Islands.
First, examining the UBS v. IRS case, the IRS could file a
"John Doe" summons only after arresting and charging Mr.
Birkenfield. He cooperated with the U.S. government and during
his deposition indicated that "it was his understanding that UBS
had thousands of Swiss accounts opened by U.S. clients, the
majority of which were undeclared and never disclosed to the
IRS." 06 Mr. Birkenfleld also stated that UBS Switzerland had
"$20 billion of assets under management in the United States,
201. Sheppard, supra note 172, at 500; see also DIVIDEND TAx AnusE, supra note 4.
202. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http:ll
fi-webgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibingetdoc.cgi?dbname=lll-congbills&docid=f-s506is.
txt.pdf.
203. Sheppard, supra note 172, at 493.
204. Sheppard, supra note 172, at 493.
205. Sheppard, supra note 172, at 493.
206. TAx HAVEN BAj'xs AN U.S. TAx COMPLIANCE, supra note 3, at 87.
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undeclared business, which earned the bank approximately $200
million per year in revenues. "0
Moreover, UBS entered into the DPA with the United States,
admitting that it helped U.S. taxpayers evade taxes .2 " Thus, in
the case of UBS, the U.S. filed its "John Doe" summons with solid
information from a UBS insider. The "John Doe" summons filed
against UBS was not a fishing expedition.""9 Ed Davis, a Miami
partner with Astigarraga Davis specializing in international tax
issues said, "it's not a fishing expedition. We know there are
American bank accounts. The Swiss have admitted tax evasion. So
if it's a fishing expedition, it's a fishing expedition in a barrel of
fish. 210
If the IRS files a "John Doe" summons against either banks or
hedge funds in the Cayman Islands, the "John Doe" summons
would be much more inquisitorial and speculative in nature than
the UBS summons. None of the factors present in UBS are pre-
sent in the case of Cayman Islands hedge funds. The IRS cur-
rently has no Cayman Islands equivalent of Mr. Birkenfield who
has pled guilty to tax evasion and no major bank or hedge fund
that has admitted to helping U.S. taxpayers evade taxes through
hedge fund investments. However, there are reports that show
hedge fund investors in the Cayman Islands are evading taxes. 1
Furthermore, the IRS has announced in the press that hedge
funds in places like the Cayman Islands are being watched and
investigated by the agency." 2 Yet the agency has no direct lead
like it did in the UBS case. Without more direct information, the
IRS cannot go forward with another "John Doe" summons.
Second, the IRS had a target in the UBS case. UBS manage-
ment coordinated an elaborate plan for wealthy Americans to hide
their assets. 1 Mr. Birkenfield told authorities that UBS went as
far as "smuggling diamonds in toothpaste tubes.""' Thus, the IRS
was faced with a bank acting recklessly and an employee willing
to tell all. On the other hand, the IRS currently has no similar
207. TAx HAVEN BANKS AND~ U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 3, at 87.
208. Brannigan, supra note 135.
209. Cf. Camp, supra note 122, at 34 (noting that a "John Doe" summons is an
inquisitorial fishing expedition).
210. John Pacenti, IRS Fight with UBS Raises Tax Treaty Question, BRowARD
DAILY Bus. REV., May 18, 2009, reprinted in 2009 WLNR 21925783.
211. See DIVIDEND TAx ABUsE, supra note 4, at 15; BusiN'mss AND TAx ADVANTAGES,
supra note 5; see also Sheppard, supra note 6.
212. Strasburg & Drucker, supra note 124; Orol, supra note 124.
213. Pacenti, supra note 210.
214. Pacenti, supra note 210.
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target in the Cayman Islands. There are over 9,000 mutual funds
in the Cayman Islands, most of which are hedge funds .2 "5 That
means there are over 9,000 targets that could be harboring tax
evaders. Moreover, the IRS will not likely focus on an individual
hedge fund because this would limit the number of detectable tax
evaders. Instead, the IRS would target a major bank in the Cay-
man Islands that holds accounts of U.S. persons investing in
hedge funds in the Cayman Islands. The CIMA reported 266
banks at the end of December 2009.16 The chances of the IRS find-
ing a similar situation to UBS where thousands of U.S. taxpayers
are dodging taxes in the same bank or hedge fund are slim.
Without a major bank or hedge fund, or sufficient information
on specific tax evasion in the Cayman Islands, the IRS would find
it hard to similarly file a "John Doe" summons against a Cayman
Islands hedge fund or bank. If the IRS were to file a "John Doe"
summons against all hedge funds in the Cayman Islands, the out-
cry of injustice would be heard loud and far. The Cayman Islands
would claim that their sovereignty has been infringed upon and
the hedge fund industry would cry "fishing expedition." The differ-
ence would be that in the Cayman Islands hedge funds' case, they
would be right in lodging this complaint.
Third, and most importantly, the IRS would be seeking out
entirely different tax evaders than in Switzerland. 1 In the UBS
case, the tax evaders were mostly wealthy individuals. In connec-
tion with UBS, the IRS has requested the names of individuals in
the settlement agreement and has prosecuted only individuals.
However, the Cayman Islands seem to involve large financial
institutions and corporations participating in dividend tax abuse.
The Cayman Islands might involve private individuals but most of
the signs point to the Cayman Islands involving an entirely differ-
ent tax evader.
The IRS achieved its goal in the UBS case and scared
thousands into voluntary disclosure .218 Now, the U.S. government
must take the next step and pass legislation aimed at deterring
international tax evasion. As evidenced by the national attention
the settlement agreement received, and the lack of coverage with
215. LIST OF MUTUAL FUNDS REGISTERED/LICENSED WITH THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
MONETARY AUTHORITY, supra note 27.
216. CAYMAN ISLANDS MONETARY AUTHORITY, BANKING STATISTICS (2009), http:ll
www.cimoney.com.ky/statsreg-ent/stats-eg-ent.aspx?id=200&ekmensel=e2f22c9a-
14_72_-200_-6.
217. See discussion supra Section II(B)(2).
218. Cutler, supra note 178, at 434.
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the current obstacles facing the settlement, the government might
have gotten exactly what it wanted-thousand of taxpayers
scared into disclosure. Only the future will tell how far Commis-
sioner Shulman and Congress are willing to go. If the past is an
indication, the government will move on after scaring
thousands."' 9
C. What Should Investors in Cayman Islands Hedge
Funds Do?
Even if the IRS does not go after hedge fund investors in the
Cayman Islands, American investors are evading taxes are break-
ing the law. The question then is what should these investors do?
The voluntary disclosure program ended October 15. However, the
IRS says that taxpayers can still come forward and voluntarily
report offshore accounts."' Ron Cimino, head of the Justice
Department Tax Division's Western Section, said that the govern-
ment works hard to "provide every incentive for your clients. ... to
come back into the system to minimize the sanctions that could be
imposed on them."2 2 ' Cimino also said that taxpayers are "given an
opportunity because the service is not focused in on you as a
target." 22
Furthermore, the Revised IRS Voluntary Disclosure Practice
states that "a voluntary disclosure occurs when the communica-
tion is truthful, timely, complete. 2 It also states that a disclosure
occurs when "the taxpayer shows a willingness to cooperate with
the IRS in determining his or her correct tax liability; and the tax-
payer makes good faith arrangements with the IRS to pay in full,
the tax, interest, and any penalties determined by the IRS to be
applicable . 2 24 The program does not guarantee immunity from
prosecution, but that it may result in withheld prosecutions. 2
Also, American taxpayers investing in offshore hedge funds
need to know that they should file a Report of Foreign Bank and
Financial Accounts ("FBAR"). Until recently, attorneys and
219. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 960 (summarizing that those in control during the
presidency of George W. Bush fiercely opposed OECD efforts then passed TIEA's after
9/11 but only to look for terrorists).
220. Cutler, supra note 178.
221. Cutler, supra note 178.
222. Cutler, supra note 178.
223. IRS, REVISED IRS VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, http://www.irs.gov/
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accountants have commonly advised hedge fund investors that
they did not have to file a FBAR report .22 ' The IRS defines FBAR
as a yearly report of a foreign financial account, including a bank
account, brokerage account, mutual fund, unit trust, or other
types of financial accounts."' If the person has a "financial inter-
est in, or signature or other authority over, a bank, securities or
other financial account in a foreign country" that person must
report the relationship. 2 The difficulty has always been how to
define "person" as enumerated under the Code of Federal Regula-
tion § 103.24 concerning the reporting of foreign financial
accounts and on the FBAR form. In an announcement on June 5,
2009, the IRS stated that the definition of "person"~ was "a citizen
or resident of the United States, a domestic partnership, a domes-
tic corporation, or a domestic estate or trust. 2129 Moreover, IRS
officials have recently "made comments indicating that certain
U.S. investors in off-shore hedge funds must file an FBAR." 30
Thus, even if the investor is not a American person and instead a
foreign corporation, the investor should file an FBAR. The IRS
extended this past year's due date for filing FBAR's because of the
controversy and confusion over who had to file them .23 ' Anyone
who has an offshore hedge fund account should be cautious and
file an FBAR given the IRS' recent announcements. 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The IRS took a huge step forward in its fight against interna-
tional tax evasion. 3 Switzerland might still have banking
secrecy, but tax evasion by U.S. taxpayers in Switzerland seems
less likely to occur. 3 Concern over international tax evasion,
though, needs to be more than the flavor of the month. The U.S.
226. Strasburg & Drucker, supra note 124.
227. IRS, REPORT OF FOREIGN BANK AND FINANCIAL Accouirrs, http://www.irs.gov/
businesses/smalllarticle/0,,id=148849,00.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); see also
Reports of Foreign Financial Accounts, 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (2010).
228. Reports of Foreign Financial Accounts, 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (2010).
229. Press Release, IRS, IRS Clarifies Requirement for Filing FBAR Form Due
This Month (June 5, 2009), reprinted in 2009 WTLNR 11300061.
230. Orol, supra note 124.
231. IRS, INTERNAL REvENU-E BULLETIN: NOTICE 2009-62 (Aug. 31, 2009), http:ll
www.irs.gov/irb/2009-35_IRB/ar~l.html#d~e25.
232. Strasburg & Drucker, supra note 124; Orol, supra note 124.
233. Oldest Swiss Bank Tells Clients to Sell U.S. Assets or Leave, DAILY Bus. REV.,
Sept. 9, 2009 (finding that Switzerland's oldest bank is telling wealthy clients to sell
their U.S. assets or leave because of concerns after the UBS v. IRS settlement).
234. Bart, supra note 198 ("Switzerland will start assisting foreign states to pursue
those citizens that use Swiss bank accounts to evade taxes.").
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government is heavily in debt and sorely needs the $100 billion in
estimated yearly tax loses. The only way for the government to
truly fight international tax evasion is by passing legislation that
will require offshore banks and securities firms to disclose U.S.
accounts. Moreover, offshore tax havens, like the Cayman Islands,
need to be held responsible for accounts held by Americans. The
IRS v. UBS settlement was a remarkable but singular act in the
fight against international tax evasion. The United States should
do more than file a "John Doe" summons against Cayman Islands
hedge funds. It should change the landscape of international
banking and investing.
